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Gaining Recognition Through Participatory Mapping? The 
Role of Adat Land in the Implementation of the Merauke 
Integrated Food and Energy Estate in Papua, Indonesia 
Rosita Dewi
► Dewi, R. (2016). Gaining recognition through participatory mapping? The role of adat land in the imple-
mentation of the Merauke Integrated Food and Energy Estate in Papua, Indonesia. ASEAS – Austrian Jour-
nal of South-East Asian Studies, 9(1), 87-106. 
Participatory mapping has recently become an instrument used by NGOs to advocate 
for adat (customary) land in Indonesia. Maps produced from participatory mapping are 
expected to support legal recognition through land formalization or titling. In order to 
stop land grabbing through the Merauke Integrated Food and Energy Estate (MIFEE) proj-
ect, this strategy has also been applied in Merauke district, Papua. However, the pitfalls 
of communal participatory mapping have brought negative impacts to adat communi-
ties. This paper analyzes the land grabbing and mapping processes in three villages in 
the MIFEE area to show the unexpected consequences of participatory mapping. These 
mapping processes have caused fragmentation and conflict among adat communities. 
Furthermore, the legal recognition of communal adat land ownership is facilitating the 
buy-out of adat land by companies and/or the state.
Keywords: Adat; Land Grabbing; MIFEE; Papua; Participatory Mapping

INTRODUCTION1
Gaining legal recognition for customary (adat) land is still a major challenge for 
indigenous people in Indonesia. Adat can be described as a way of life that links 
history, land, and law (Davidson & Henley, 2007). With regard to the recogni-
tion of adat communities, land constitutes a central issue because many adat 
lands are currently threatened by land grabbing. Compared to other provinces in 
Indonesia, Papua is leading in gaining legal recognition for adat land rights. Pap-
uan adat communities gained legal recognition through the Special Autonomy 
Law for Papua No. 21/2001. It seems, however, that legal recognition through 
this law has failed to protect the customary rights of adat communities, par-
ticularly with regard to their adat land. Although legal recognition is believed to 
be the best method to guarantee these rights, it has clearly proved insufficient 
in the case of Papua. This is most clearly shown in Merauke district, where the 
Merauke Integrated Food and Energy Estate (MIFEE) project is developed. 
The MIFEE project comprises over a million ha of land and is the first na-
1 A draft version of this paper was presented at the Graduate School of Global Studies Workshop 
Series 2014 “Environmental Governance and Development Policy in Southeast Asia”, 10 January 
2015, Sophia University, Tokyo.
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tional project in Papua developed by the Indonesian government after Papua was 
granted autonomy. The central government considers MIFEE an ideal space for agri-
cultural expansion since its vast arable areas contain much potential. In 2010, MIFEE 
replaced the Merauke Integrated Rice Estate (MIRE) which was established by the local 
government in 2008 to boost investment. After failing to attract investors, MIRE was 
relaunched as MIFEE for broader investment targets in August 2010 (Ito, Rachman, & 
Savitri, 2014). The central government allocated 1.283 million ha for this new project 
(Government of Indonesia, 2010). 
However, the project has faced a number of implementation problems, especially 
land conflicts with local communities. Through MIFEE, investors have taken over 
local adat lands of the Marind Anim tribe, one of the major tribes that lives in the 
Merauke district. The Papuan local government granted location permits for conces-
sions to companies without any prior consent from the Marind Anim as the adat 
landowners and thus, land grabbing has been a major issue in the area (Aliansi Ger-
akan Reformasi Agraria, 2012; Ito et al., 2014; Lamonge, 2012; Zakaria, Kleden, & 
Franky, 2011). 
Land grabbing refers to the purchase or lease of vast tracts of land to create ag-
ricultural operations producing food, feed, or fuel, the aim being to secure the long 
term supplies by foreign investors, private investors, or government (Arellano-López, 
2012; Daniel, 2011; Daniel & Mittal, 2009). According to the FAO, there are three in-
dicators to define land grabbing: first, the size of land with a minimum of 1,000 ha for 
a single deal; second, the direct involvement of foreign investors or governments; and 
third, negative impacts on food security in the recipient countries (Borras, Kay, Go-
mez, & Wilkinson, 2012). However, several researchers have criticized this definition 
as being too narrow. They argue that many land grabs are currently not carried out 
by foreign investors but also by domestic and transnational companies, often with 
encouragement and support from the central governments. Furthermore, land grab-
bing is not only limited to large-scale land deals (Borras & Franco, 2011, p. 5; Borras et 
al., 2012, p. 404). In land grabbing, the state engages in re-ordering or restructuring 
the country’s land tenure system through policies that justify the use of idle, under-
utilized, or sparsely populated territories thus facilitating the entrance of large-scale 
land-based investment (Arellano-López, 2012; Daniel, 2011; Daniel & Mittal, 2009). 
For the purpose to analyzing MIFEE, land grabbing is defined as controlling or taking 
possession of large-scale lands in order to transform them into agricultural estates by 
domestic and/or transnational companies with the engagement of local and central 
governments. 
In order to protect adat land in Merauke, NGOs have adopted participatory map-
ping as a way to advocate for adat rights. The purpose of participatory mapping is to 
gain land titling and formalization for adat land. Land titling is the specific type of 
formalization in which the state demarcates the boundaries of the land, records own-
ership, and recognizes the landholders’ ownership and the right to sell, mortgage, 
or transfer it (Hall, Hirsch, & Li, 2011). Many researchers have examined the posi-
tive impacts of participatory mapping in helping traditional communities to protect 
their ancestral lands (Deddy, 2006; Gessa, 2008; Herlihy & Knapp, 2003). Some argue 
that local people can use maps created from participatory mapping to legitimize their 
claims over customary lands. Or in some cases, traditional communities were revi-
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talized by the process of participatory mapping (Peluso, 1995; Pramono, Natalia, & 
Janting, 2006). Furthermore, participatory mapping may promote indigenous natu-
ral resource management and reduce conflict (Deddy, 2006). Such research provides 
positive encouragement for NGOs to promote participatory mapping. The pitfalls of 
communal participatory mapping may, however, also create several negative impacts. 
Research has shown that participatory mapping can cause fragmentation or conflict 
among communities due to the fixation of land control and the map’s rigidity. It can 
weaken indigenous ideas and conceptions of space and promote land privatization. 
Moreover, participatory mapping expected to counter government mapping can be 
regulated and co-opted by the state (Fox, 2011; Fox, Krisnawati, & Hershock, 2005; 
Hodgson & Schroeder, 2002). The concerns about participatory mapping mentioned 
above were also found in the participatory mapping process in Merauke. 
To date, there has been no research on how participatory mapping was intro-
duced in the MIFEE area, what the impacts are, and how the process differs from that 
in other parts of Indonesia. For that reason, this article aims to fill this knowledge gap 
and show the unexpected consequences of participatory mapping in Papua.
LEGAL RECOGNITION OF ADAT LAND RIGHTS
During the Suharto government, the state did not pay due attention to adat com-
munities and treated their land as state land (Hall et al., 2011). The 1999 Human 
Rights Act states that communal land, being part of the cultural identity, deserves 
recognition and protection (Fitzpatrick, 2007, p. 77). After the regime change, this 
recognition corresponded with the main agenda of the Aliansi Masyarakat Adat Nu-
santara (AMAN), the national indigenous peoples’ organization that struggles for 
the recognition of adat communities (Arizona & Cahyadi, 2013). In 2011, AMAN and 
other NGOs advocating for the rights of adat communities proposed the draft bill of 
Recognition and Protection of Adat Communities and called on the Constitutional 
Court to review the Forestry Law No. 41/1999 regarding the existence of adat forest. 
However, until today, these efforts have still not materialized in substantial changes 
to the land regime. The decision of the Constitutional Court to recognize the exis-
tence of adat forest land has not changed the government policy regarding adat land 
in general. Adat land is still treated as idle land that is put under the jurisdiction of 
the state (state land). Hence, land conflicts between adat communities and the state 
continue.
In fact, however, adat communities do not have to wait for the enactment of a na-
tional law to gain recognition, but local governments at the district or province level 
have the authority to recognize adat communities under local regulations. After the 
fall of Suharto’s authoritarian regime, the new government under president Habibie 
started implementing decentralization policies in 1999.2 These policies transferred 
power from central to local government and gave wider authority to local govern-
ments to enact their own local regulations as long as they do not contradict nation-
al law. This also includes regional authority for the recognition of adat (Bakker & 
2 See regional autonomy laws No. 22/1999 and No. 32/2004, and laws on the fiscal balance between 
central and regional governments No. 25/1999 and No. 33/2004.
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Moniaga, 2010). However, local governments are usually reluctant to recognize adat 
communities in their regions as they are competing to attract investment for regional 
development. Land designated for concession areas or other investment has often 
been cultivated by adat communities, especially outside of Java. Therefore, local gov-
ernments perceive the legal recognition of adat communities as a burden. As a result, 
local governments often facilitate land grabbing by working closely with corporate 
actors (Alhamid, Ballard, & Kanowski, 2009). 
THE CASE STUDY SITE
The district of Merauke comprises a vast area of 4.6 million ha in the autonomous 
province of Papua. The total population of Merauke district is 263,664 people (Popu-
lation and Civil Registration Board of Merauke District, 2015). The indigenous popu-
lation of Papua comprises 56.3%; the rest are transmigrants (43.7%) who mainly came 
from Java and Makassar (Statistics Indonesia, 2011). The biggest tribe in Merauke is 
the Marind tribe, often called Marind Anim. This tribe is divided into seven big clans: 
Gebze, Mahuze, Ndiken, Kaize, Samkakai, Balagaize, and Basik-basik. Each clan has 
its own clan leader. Each local village, where Marind Anim live, usually consists of 
these seven clans and is headed by an adat leader. Whereas this leader represents cus-
tomary law, each local village also has a village leader that is legally recognized by the 
state. In addition, there is also a customary community council (Lembaga Masyarakat 
Adat, LMA) leader – a position created by the central government after the establish-
ment of the Papua Special Autonomy Law. This function sometimes overlaps with 
the function of the adat leader. These three levels of leadership make up the political 
complexity of local villages.
In the Marind Anim tribe, adat land ownership is based on clan membership with 
borders that have been agreed upon among the clans that own the adat land. Usually, 
land ownership is based on ancestral heritage and passed down through oral stories 
from generation to generation. Trees, stones, rivers, or sago palm huts are used to 
signify the land borders of adat land. Adat communities also have their own mecha-
nisms for leasing adat land. To lease a piece of adat land from one clan, the transfer 
has to be agreed upon by the clan members and the seven clans leaders who live in the 
village through an adat meeting that is led by the village adat leader. 
In this article, I examine three cases in three villages – Selu, Duku, and Alu village3 
– which serve as examples of the land grab process. Selu (435 people, 108 households) 
represents a village that accepted company cultivation of their adat land in the early 
stages of the MIFEE implementation, when John Gluba Gebze still served as the head 
of Merauke district (2001-2010). Duku (691 people, 153 households) represents a vil-
lage that accepted company cultivation of their adat land after Romanus Mbaraka be-
came the new head of Merauke district in 2011. And Alu (430 people, 73 households) 
is a village that rejected company cultivation of their adat land. All three villages initi-
ated and conducted participatory mapping (Statistic Indonesia, 2011; Yasanto, 2013). 
The research scope is limited to the period between the implementation of the 
MIFEE project (2010) and the end of Susilo Bambang Yudhono’s (SBY) presidential 
3 Due to the sensitivity of the issue, the names of the villages have been changed.
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term (2015). Data collection was carried out in the Merauke district in January, Au-
gust, and September of 2014. Data were collected through interviews with leaders in 
each of the three villages, adat community members in each village, the former gov-
ernor who initiated the MIFEE project, local government representatives, the com-
pany that holds concessions in that area, and NGOs which act as advocates on behalf 
of the adat communities in these villages. 
MIFEE AS A LAND GRABBING PROJECT IN THE NAME OF DEVELOPMENT
MIFEE was launched by the central government in August 2010. The project is meant 
to strengthen the national food and energy stock and at the same time accelerate 
economic development in Merauke (Government of Indonesia, 2010). MIFEE is a 
continuation of the Merauke District Program. The local government launched this 
investment program on the 105th anniversary of the Merauke district in 2007. The 
program was marked for the symbolic handover of adat land from adat communities 
to the government to be hereafter given to the investors. Later, in 2008, the local gov-
ernment and investors agreed to create a specific project called MIRE (Awas MIFEE, 
2012). The establishment of MIRE was in line with president SBY’s speech on the 
great rice harvest in 2006: “First, let’s develop Merauke as a rice granary; second, de-
velop plantations in Merauke such as sugarcane and palm oil to deal with food secu-
rity problems” (Yudhoyono, 2006). In order to realize MIRE, a consortium of 15 Saudi 
Arabian investors and Indonesian corporations was ready to take part in the project 
(Rulistia, 2008). The Bin Laden Group, an investor from Saudi Arabia, prepared USD 
4 billion to develop 500,000 ha of land in Merauke. However, this investment was 
cancelled due to the global financial crises (Awas MIFEE, 2012). To make the project 
suited for the new conditions, the government re-packaged the MIRE project into 
MIFEE. MIFEE was expected to attract investment in Merauke that was not only 
limited to rice cultivation but also in the plantation and forestry sector. It was in line 
with president SBY’s ambition to “feed Indonesia, feed the world” after the global 
food and energy crises in 2008 (Awas MIFEE, 2012). Under Government Regulation 
No. 18/2010, MIFEE was officially launched in 2010.
However, these investments threaten adat land. From 2007 to 2010, the district head 
granted location permits for over 2.4 million ha of land (more than 50% of the to-
tal area of Merauke) to 36 companies.4 When granting location permits, the district 
head based his decision solely on the spatial planning of the district, without notify-
ing or receiving the consent of the adat communities, which were in effect the adat 
landowners. The location permits neglected the rights of the Marind Anim people. 
This became the major factor that prevented permit holders from establishing plan-
tations. In order to make the process of land transfer smoother, several companies 
used illegal ways to get permission from adat communities.5 Local government and 
village leaders were frequently involved in this process.
4 This area was greater than allocated in the initial plans for the MIFEE (1.283 million ha) (Investment 
Board of Merauke District, 2011).
5 Companies used many methods to ensure the transfer of land rights from adat communities, including 
intimidation, co-opting village leaders, and cheating during the negotiation process (Zakaria et al., 2011).
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No Company Commodity
Area (ha)
Location 
(subdistrict)Location  
Permission
Operation  
Permission
korindo group
1 PT. Dongin 
Prabhawa
palm oil 39,800 34,000 Ngguti
2 PT. Berkat Cipta 
Abadi
palm oil 40,000 14,525 Ulilin
3 PT. Inocin Abadi industrial timber 
plantation 
(IUPHHK-HTI)
100,000 99,665 Ulilin
4 PT. Papua Agro 
Lestari
palm oil 39,800 32,347 Ulilin
medco group
5 PT. Selaras Inti 
Semesta
IUPHHK-HTI 301,600 169,400 Kaptel
6 PT. Medco Papua 
Industri Lestari
wood and chip 2,800 na Kaptel
7 PT. Medco Papua 
Alam Lestari
IUPHHK-HTI 74,219 na Kaptel
modern land group
8 PT. Wanamulia 
Sukses Sejati
IUPHHK-HTI 61,000 na Animha
9 PT. Agri Surya 
Agung
sugarcane 40,000 36,774 Ilwayab, Tubang, 
Ngguti
10 PT. Nusantara 
Agri Resources
sugarcane 40,000 39,005 Ilwayab, Ngguti
11 PT. Mega Surya 
Agung
soybean, corn 24,697 (changed 
from coordinate 
into 9,882)
na Kaptel, Ngguti
12 PT. Wanamulia 
Sukses Sejati
IUPHHK-HTI 96,553 na Kaptel, Muting
13 PT. Wanamulia 
Sukses Sejati
IUPHHK-HTI 116,000 na Kaptel, Okaba, 
Ngguti, Muting
hardaya group
14 PT. Hardaya 
Sugar Papua 
Plantation
sugarcane 44,812 37,898 Jagebob
15 PT. Hardaya 
Sawit Papua 
Plantation
palm oil 62,150 44,740 Jagebob
Table 1. Companies and Concession Area in MIFEE, 2014. 
(Investment Board of Merauke District, 19 August 2014).
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No Company Commodity
Area (ha)
Location 
(subdistrict)Location  
Permission
Operation  
Permission
rajawali group
16 PT. Cenderawa-
sih Jaya Mandiri
sugarcane 40,000 22,117 Malind, Kurik
17 PT. Karya Bumi 
Papua
sugarcane 30,000 15,628 Malind, Kurik
18 PT. Rizki Kemi-
lau Berjaya
sugarcane 10,000 na Kurik
astra group
19 PT. Dharma Agro 
Lestari
sugarcane 50,000 na Tubang, Okaba
20 PT. Bhakti Agro 
Lestary
sugarcane 26,098 na Animha
mayora group
21 PT. Swarna Hijau 
Indah
sugarcane 36,363 33,668 Tubang, Kimaam
22 PT. Randu kun-
ing Utama
sugarcane 40,000 na Ilwayab, Tubang, 
Kimaam
23 PT. Kurnia Alam 
Nusantara
sugarcane 50,00 na Tubang, Ilwayab
bia group
24 PT. Bio Inti 
Agrindo
palm oil 39,900 36,400 Ulilin
25 PT. Ulilin Agro 
Lestari
palm oil 12,538 na Ulilin
wilmar group
26 PT. Wahana 
Samudra Sentosa
IUPHHK-HTI 79,033 na Kaptel, Ngguti
27 PT. Anugrah Re-
jeki Nusantara
sugarcane 27,457 na Tanah Miring, 
Animha
28 PT. Lestari Subur 
Indonesia
sugarcane 25,102 na Jagebob, Sota
ams group
29 PT. Agrinusa 
Persada Mulia
palm oil 40,000 39,692 Muting
30 PT. Agriprima 
Cipta Pesada
palm oil 33,540 na Muting, Ulilin
Table 1 (continued).
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The local government usually gave support to the companies rather than the adat 
communities. When first approaching these communities, local government repre-
sentatives did not always explain the company’s project in detail. They used money 
and vague development promises to persuade adat communities to support the proj-
ects. On the whole, adat landowner communities agreed, especially if the head of 
the Merauke district was the one to approach the communities directly. Because the 
negotiation process excluded any detailed explanation of the proposed projects and 
because much information was deliberately withheld by the company, the land trans-
fer process became a land grab.
No Company Commodity
Area (ha)
Location 
(subdistrict)Location  
Permission
Operation  
Permission
without group
31 PT. China Ghate 
Agriculture 
Development
rice, cassava, 
ground nut, corn
20,000 na Okaba
32 PT. Internusa 
Jaya Sejahtera
palm oil 18,567 na Muting, Ulilin, 
Elikobel
33 PT. Purna Karsa 
Wibawa
sugarcane 20,223 na Ngguti, Tubang, 
Okaba
34 PT. Plasma 
Nutfah Marind 
Papua
IUPHHK-HTI 67,736 64,050 Ngguti, Okaba, 
Kaptel
35 PT. Merauke 
Rayon Jaya
HTI 206,800 na na
36 PT. Sino Indo-
nesia Shunlida 
Fishing
fish processing 
industry
33 na Merauke
37 PT. Dwikarya 
Reksa Abadi
fishery na na Ilwayab
38 PT. Cipta Papua 
Agri Lestari
HTI na na
39 PT. Indonesia 
Jaya Makmur 
Investasi
sugarcane 20,223 na Ngguti, Tubang
40 PT. Global Papua 
Abadi
sugarcane 31,026 na Tanah Miring, 
Jagebob
41 PT. Karisma Agri 
Pratama
rice, corn, 
ground nut
40,000 37,786 Tubang
Table 1 (continued). 
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The Village of Selu 
In Selu, for example, the Selaras Inti Semesta (SIS) company wanted to gain the right 
to cultivate adat land. SIS is a subsidiary of the Medco Group, which was founded 
by Arifin Panigoro, an active member of the Indonesian Democratic Party of Struggle 
(PDI-P). He was particularly active in encouraging Merauke’s local government to 
open up the district to investment for large-scale plantations and agriculture (Awas 
MIFEE, 2012). SIS held a concession from the local government for over 169,000 ha 
of land (Investment Board of Merauke District, 2014) that they and the local govern-
ment made use of without the consent of the communities (Zakaria et al., 2011). In 
response, the communities blocked the company from entering their lands. In order 
to open the blockade and get the permission of the communities, SIS asked John 
Gluba Gebze to help SIS to approach the communities in his role as the district head 
of Merauke. Due to his close relationship with Arifin Panigoro,6 John Gluba Gebze 
agreed to help the Medco Group approach the communities about leasing their adat 
land to SIS. After the involvement of the district head, who was also a member of 
the Marind Anim tribe, the adat communities in Selu agreed to negotiate with the 
company representatives.
We made a rejection letter that was sent to the district head. [It] forced John 
[Gluba Gebze] to visit Selu together with the company. . . . He promised to de-
velop Selu if they gave permission for the company to operate in Selu. (head of 
Selu, 22 August 2014)
The district head promised, if the adat communities in Selu permitted Medco 
to cultivate their lands, Selu would become a small city. . . . They [the company] 
came to the adat communities and brought a document that was signed by the 
district head, so that the adat leader had to accept it. (adat leader of Selu, 22 
August 2014)
In the end, the adat community agreed to give permission to SIS in exchange for 
IDR 300 million (USD 22,750) – tali asih (ex gratia) – to compensate for the use of adat 
land. Although the agreement was in writing, the company did not fully explain the 
details of the project during negotiations with the adat communities. Moreover, it 
did not mention the exact area of the adat land to be used by the project. As a result, 
once the project started, the communities felt that the company had cheated them. 
For example, one interviewed adat member, explained that he did not know that his 
land would be used for 60 years after 2009. This type of problem emerged because 
the process of obtaining free, prior, and informed consent was not carried out ap-
propriately. Community members did not know the exact content of the agreement 
between the leaders in Selu and SIS. Once the company started to clear forests and 
establish forest plantations, the ability to gather food from the forest was limited, 
affecting the livelihoods of communities in Selu. Under a Corporate Social Responsi-
6 The close relationship between Arifin Panigoro and John Gluba Gebze (JGG) was manifested by his 
granting Panigoro the title Arifin Dipanigoro Warku Gebze as a member of the Gebze clan. This nomina-
tion enabled Panigoro to become the owner of the adat land (Tabloid Jubi, 2009).
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bility (CSR) project, the company created a vegetable garden (kebun sayur) and a rice 
field for the communities to cultivate. This project did not work, however, because 
the adat communities were not familiar with rice cultivation as they traditionally 
gathered food from the forests. Few people joined the CSR project. In addition, few 
people in Selu were employed to work for the company. The communities became 
dissatisfied with these conditions and were disappointed as the promises from the 
district head had not materialized. As a result, they now want to reclaim land from 
the company.
The Village of Duku 
Land transfer in Duku offers another example for land grabbing. The PT. Karya Bumi 
Papua and PT Cenderawasih Jaya Mandiri companies (subsidiaries of the Rajawali 
Group) were granted location permits by the district head in 2010 for over 70,000 ha7 
of sugarcane plantations (Investment Board of Merauke District, 2014). The negotia-
tion process involved the head of the Merauke district parliament approaching the 
adat communities in Duku and asking permission for the Rajawali Group to open 
sugarcane plantations on their lands. The company, through the head of the district 
parliament, promised to improve the economic conditions of the adat community 
in Duku through CSR projects. The interesting thing in this case is the position of 
the head of the district parliament. Not only did he serve as head of parliament, he 
was also the consular head of a local NGO (Yasanto) in Merauke. This NGO signed 
a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) with the Rajawali Group to implement an 
empowerment program as a CSR project. This explains why the presence of an NGO 
advocating for the adat community has not been effective in this case. 
The Rajawali Group also co-opted the LMA leader in Duku to help persuade the adat 
community to give their lands to the company. The LMA leader in this village is more 
active in dealing with matters outside the village, whereas the adat leader only deals 
with matters inside the village, particularly rituals on behalf of the community. With 
regard to the communication with the company, the LMA, supported by the village 
secretary (village administration), is more active compared to the adat leader. Dur-
ing the negotiation process, the company promised the leaders in Duku money for 
their efforts to convince the communities. The LMA leader in Duku began to actively 
persuade community members to lease their land for plantations by promising them 
that they would earn money from the lease. In return, the adat leader, the LMA, and 
the village leader in Duku as well as the village administrators received a monthly 
payment of between IDR 500,000 (USD 38) and 1,000,000 (USD 76) from the Ra-
jawali Group.
By involving the head of the district parliament and the LMA leader at the village 
level, the companies were successful in getting the adat community to agree to lease 
their land for sugarcane cultivation. On 21 November 2010, seven clans signed an 
agreement document, which stipulated that 158 households would receive IDR 6 bil-
lion (USD 455,060) in compensation for their adat land. The money was to be given 
out by the head of each clan, according to the area that the clan occupied. 
7 PT. Cenderawasih Jaya Mandiri holds a location permit for 40,000 ha in the Malind and Kurik sub-
districts; PT. Karya Bumi Papua holds a location permit for 30,000 ha in the Kurik sub-district.
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The Village of Alu 
In contrast to the cases described above, the community in Alu, although also threat-
ened by the MIFEE land grab (by the Rajawali group), still retains their land.  There 
are two major reasons for this: First, since their land was used for transmigration pro-
grams during the Suharto period, the contested area of community land was small 
(around 15,000 ha), and second, NGOs actively advocated for the protection of adat 
land in Alu. Due to the involvement of NGO advocates, the community maintained a 
strong position vis-à-vis the company and local government representatives. Pusaka, 
an NGO from Jakarta, was very active in mobilizing the adat communities. The vil-
lage sent an official letter to the Rajawali Group and local government to reject the re-
quest to cultivate their adat land. Later, in 2011, as advised by Pusaka, the village also 
created an adat land map, using participatory mapping exercises in order to counter 
the government map that was used for MIFEE investment guidance.
As seen above, agricultural expansion of MIFEE has threatened the existence of 
adat land of the Marind Anim community through land grabbing. The government 
issued the concession over the adat land without the consent of the adat communi-
ties as the legitimate owners of the land. The local government was involved in a land 
leasing process that was perceived as unfair and harmful by the adat communities. 
Supported by the local NGOs, therefore, adat communities started to conduct par-
ticipatory mapping to protect their adat land. 
CONDUCTING PARTICIPATORY MAPPING TO GAIN  
RECOGNITION OF ADAT LAND
In Indonesia, participatory mapping began in 1992, following the international trend 
in the 1990s to actively advocate for customary rights through participatory mapping. 
The first participatory mapping project was conducted by the World Wildlife Fund 
(WWF) in Kayan Mentarang, East Kalimantan (Peluso, 1995). Participatory mapping 
of Dayak communities was also conducted in West Kalimantan by the Pancur Kasih 
organization in 1995 in order to receive due recognition for the adat communities and 
their lands (Pramono et al., 2006). Participatory mapping became more prevalent af-
ter the establishment of the government’s Regulation No. 69/1996 concerning public 
participation in spatial planning. Indonesian activists responded to the regulation by 
forming the Network for Participatory Mapping (Jaringan Kerja Pemetaan Partisipasi, 
JKPP) in 1996 (Pramono, Samperante, & Achmaliadi, 2009). Between 1996 and 1997, 
participatory mapping was conducted in several adat villages in Kalimantan (Deddy, 
2006). It was difficult, however, for these maps to be adopted into government poli-
cies on spatial planning, especially during the Suharto government (Pramono et al., 
2006). After Suharto’s fall in 1998, advocacy for the rights of adat communities inten-
sified. The establishment of AMAN in 1999 encouraged the struggle for the rights of 
adat communities in Indonesia. In line with the AMAN agenda, participatory map-
ping initiated by JKPP became an important strategy to strengthen adat claims to 
lands and forests in order to guarantee the continuity of their livelihood (Pramono 
et al., 2009). 
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In the province of Papua, participatory mapping has gained importance since the 
enactment of the Special Autonomy Law No. 21/2001. This law has opened up wider 
opportunities for participation, which has been used by NGOs to carry out participa-
tory mapping in several villages in Papua in order to ensure land formalization and 
titling. The implementation of MIFEE has become an obvious example for the way 
in which the Indonesian government neglects the existence and rights of adat com-
munities in Papua in exchange for support for development projects. It shows the 
contradiction of implementing a Special Autonomy Law that stipulates recognition 
for customary rights, while at the same time implementing a spatial planning process 
that prioritizes economic development at the expense of adat land in Merauke. This 
contradiction encourages NGOs to advocate for adat communities to fight against 
land grabbing in the course of MIFEE’s implementation. After the launch of the 
project, many NGOs united to form the Papuan People’s Solidarity to Reject MIFEE 
(SORPATOM). The NGO group was extremely effective in highlighting the negative 
impacts of MIFEE for adat communities in Merauke. The group wrote letters to the 
United Nations Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination (UNCERD), 
requesting the committee to urge the Indonesian government to abandon the imple-
mentation of MIFEE (Ginting & Pye, 2013). Many of the NGOs that were incorporat-
ed in SORPATOM promoted the termination of the MIFEE project because it led to 
land grabs of adat land. These NGOs did not succeed in stopping the MIFEE project 
but they believed that participatory mapping could be used as an instrument to stop 
land grabbing. They therefore persuaded communities to create adat land maps to 
protect their land and to gain legal recognition and titles for their lands.
Several of the villages that are affected by the MIFEE project have created or plan 
to create adat land maps at the behest of NGOs. The involved NGOs believe that an 
adat land map created by a participatory mapping process can be a powerful instru-
ment to counter government maps that are used to make claims over land or forest 
areas. Participatory mapping, therefore, has become a way to resist the implementa-
tion of MIFEE. Every village has its own specific reason to create an adat land map 
through participatory mapping. For example, in Selu, Yayasan Pusaka, an Indonesian 
NGO supported by international NGOs, raised awareness among adat communities 
about the importance of participatory mapping. After SIS was deemed in violation 
of its promises to Selu communities, the village leader asked Yasanto to help create 
an adat land map of Selu. Participatory mapping in Selu was conducted in 2013. The 
process took three months (from October to December). Local government funded 
the project8 in an effort to counter the negative backlash to the land grabs that had 
spread during the implementation of the MIFEE. The adat map also made it easier 
for the government to map the owners of adat land in the respective villages (Yasanto, 
2013). In addition, the close relationship maintained by Mbaraka, the new head of 
Merauke district, with Yasanto may have influenced his decision to trust the fund for 
participatory mapping of the village. 
Yayasan Pusaka was also very active in introducing participatory mapping in Alu. 
The communities in Alu trusted Yayasan Pusaka because the NGO had supported 
8 Participatory mapping for this village was funded from a grant made in 2013, provided from the Me-
rauke district budget. The local government granted IDR 560,300,000 (USD 42,410) to conduct participa-
tory mapping in five villages in Animha sub-district (Yasanto, 2013).
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them in protecting their lands from the Rajawali Group. Adat communities, through 
the head of village, asked the NGO to help with the participatory mapping of their 
adat land. In 2011, participatory mapping of the village was conducted with the fi-
nancial support of two international NGOs – the Forest Peoples Program (FPP) and 
the Climate Land Use Alliance (CLUA). In the process, a participatory adat map was 
established for the border area between Alu and neighboring villages. The map was 
anticipated to provide a last defense for Alu communities against the Rajawali Group 
as the major instrument to claim their lands. 
In Duku, the secretary of the village requested students from Musamus University 
(Universitas Musamus Merauke) to facilitate participatory mapping. The adat com-
munities in Duku felt that creating the adat land map was important and planned 
to self-fund the project. Duku was initially driven to make an adat land map after 
communities from Alu claimed parts of Duku adat land as their own. Adat commu-
nities in Duku aim to use the map to reclaim the adat land that is now claimed by 
Alu communities. However, the participatory mapping has yet to begin and remains 
under negotiation between Musamus University and village administrators in Duku.
From these three examples, it is clear that participatory mapping has become an 
important instrument to create a sense of legal ownership for the adat communities. 
In Selu, the adat map created through participatory mapping will be used to reclaim 
adat land that has been taken by the company by means of unfair negotiation. In 
Alu, adat members feel that the adat map is an important tool to protect their lands 
from a company that tried to grab them. It is also important for claiming adat land 
ownership for Alu members who feel that the community was left with too little land 
after the transmigration project. Unlike the other two villages, the Duku community 
feels that participatory mapping is important to claim lands that are threatened by 
adat communities in their neighboring village. In all three villages, adat maps created 
by participatory mapping are seen by adat people as powerful instruments to claim 
ownership of adat land. 
THE LIMITS OF PARTICIPATORY MAPPING
Experiences from several countries over the last decades have shown that participa-
tory mapping has helped communities to receive recognition of customary rights 
(Chapin, Lamb, & Threlkeld, 2005; Deddy, 2006; Gessa, 2008; Herlihy & Knapp, 2003; 
Roth, 2009). Participatory mapping has led to successful land claims, compensation 
for customary lands taken by states or companies, and the recognition of customary 
lands and territories (Fox et al., 2005; Peluso, 1995). The maps enhanced commu-
nity capacity to negotiate access to local resources, and increased their involvement 
in policy processes. However, the practice of participatory mapping may also bring 
unexpected consequences for the communities. First, mapping can cause fragmen-
tation and conflict among communities. Second, because the map fails to provide 
customary land use information, it can erode the status of indigeneity of customary 
lands. Third, the map can increase state co-optation over customary lands by giving 
the government authority to control customary lands under legal regulations (Fox, 
2011, p. 66). The participatory mapping that has been carried out in order to counter 
MIFEE has also faced the problems described by Fox (2011), including fragmentation 
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and conflict among members of the Marind Anim tribe. After participatory mapping 
was conducted, a dispute about the border between neighboring villages emerged. 
Previously the two villages did not have a rigid concept of their border but used a 
natural barrier such as a stand of trees, a river, or stones to signify the border between 
adat land held by a certain clan and to recognize existing adat land ownership. The 
border was acknowledged based on a mutual understanding among the community 
members. For example, when they hunted kangaroo (saham) and the animal died on 
another clan’s land, the hunters would divide and share the meat with the owners of 
the land.
However, after the participatory mapping was conducted, the rigidity of the map 
caused problems. The communities felt that claims to certain areas were very impor-
tant. A clear example concerns the neighboring villages of Alu and Duku. Alu wanted 
to protect their land from the company and the local government, but when they 
conducted participatory mapping, they failed to consult with the neighboring village 
of Duku. This led to their claiming an area near the border of the two villages. The 
Alu community used the map to claim adat land that overlapped with the adat land 
of Duku. This led to fragmentation between the communities in Alu and Duku. The 
two communities are both from the Marind Anim tribe and members often inter-
marry. Therefore, the adat land of these two villages does not require a rigid border. 
In addition, because of intermarriage, adat landowners cannot be divided firmly on 
the side of one village or the other, because the next generation could inherit the 
rights over adat land from either village. This is why Alu’s claim over Duku’s adat land 
ignited the anger of Duku members. On the other hand, Duku’s rejection of Alu’s 
map also sparked the anger of Alu members.
They [Duku] violated the adat land border that has been existing. Rajawali 
Group created the border beyond the original border. This caused the conflict. 
.  .  . There was a meeting between Alu and Duku to discuss this border. They 
persisted [on the newly created borders] and I evicted the Duku village head. 
(village head consultative body in Alu, 20 August 2014) 
That is Duku land, but after the company operated, they [Alu] did not accept 
that border. They defended that [border] . . . even the conducted adat meeting 
cannot solve this [adat land border] dispute. Besides that, they even threatened 
us. (village head of Duku, 21 August 2014) 
These issues not only fragmented adat communities, but also led to social con-
flict. In the case of Alu and Duku, tensions have erupted between adat members from 
both villages. Worse still, the traditional adat meeting that is customarily used to 
solve problems among adat communities has not been able to settle the problem 
of overlapping land claims. In order to settle the conflict, administrators from both 
villages agreed to bring the problem to the district head of Merauke for resolution. 
However, as of September 2014, the conflict had yet to be resolved.
This conflict shows the irony of participatory mapping of adat land. While adat 
communities struggle to gain recognition, the community itself no longer recognizes 
their own adat rules. Despite the aim to revitalize indigenous values through the 
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implementation of participatory mapping, the recognition of adat land instead keeps 
them away from their indigenous values. The conflict between Alu and Duku villag-
ers has contributed to the loss of indigenous values for the Marind Anim tribe. The 
map made things worse through a lack of information and a failure to address adat 
values during the participatory mapping process, which created misunderstandings 
about land ownership. In fact, it is considered taboo among adat communities to 
discuss the history of adat land with anyone from outside the village clan.
The case of Selu is different from the two cases above. The map created with par-
ticipatory mapping in Selu will be used to reclaim the adat land that is cultivated by 
SIS. The adat communities in Selu do not know how many hectares of land have 
already been cultivated by the company. Nonetheless, the map is also expected to be 
useful for reclaiming adat land after the contract with Medco is finished. Unlike the 
map in Alu that only delineated the border with its neighbors, the participatory adat 
map in Selu also maps adat land among the clans inside Selu. The map does not only 
show the border with the neighboring village, but also states the name of the clan 
that owns adat land within the village (Yasanto, 2013). Indeed, the goal of this map is 
not the delineation between villages but the mapping of adat landowners among the 
clans in Selu. The rigid and detailed map produced by the communities of Selu may 
loosen kinship ties within single clans of Marind Anim, causing members to become 
individualistic. This, in turn, could make clan members become more pragmatic in 
seeking economic profit as individual landowners. Because the map does not recog-
nize the concept of adat land, it may transform communal land into private land. As 
a result, a race to claim adat land may take place in this village. In the long term, the 
map may ignite fragmentation or even conflict as the participatory mapping process 
has failed to gather complete information about the history of adat land. 
Another problem is that the head of Merauke district has not yet signed the docu-
ment that would make adat maps a legal proof of adat land ownership. Accordingly, 
the map still lacks the force of law. Based on my observations, local government sup-
port for participatory mapping is only voiced to counter the negative backlash from 
implementing MIFEE. Although local government is trying to promote the protec-
tion of adat land in Merauke, its unwillingness to legalize the participatory adat map 
indicates its half-hearted support. Furthermore, the local government even intends 
to use the maps to conduct negotiations with landowners. According to them, the 
main obstacle to implement MIFEE is the complexity to lease adat land. The adat 
map makes it easier for the government and companies to target whom to negotiate 
with. A concrete example for this argument is a land deal in Baley village, where the 
company SIS leased land to set up a saw mill. As there was no adat map that showed 
the owners of the land, the company mistakenly gave financial compensation to the 
adat community in Baley. However, the adat community in the neighboring village 
(Sesa), was the actual owner of the land used to set up the factory. The situation led 
to a conflict that was disadvantageous for the company and could have been avoided 
through a detailed map. Therefore, the government and the company both benefit 
from adat maps that guide their investments. In turn, the same maps often leave adat 
communities without the legal protection they hoped to gain from the participatory 
mapping process. 
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The cases show that the communities perceive the maps as the final accomplish-
ment of all forms of struggle for their adat land: “We have our original map [participa-
tory map] that shows the border of our land” (village head consultative body in Alu, 
20 August 2014). Hence, holding an adat map means having authority over the area 
that is claimed. The communities do not realize, however, that participatory map-
ping produces flexible maps that can change at any time with social change in the 
community. Even in the NGO participatory mapping report, “it stated that the map 
is not the final map. This map is an early stage of adat land owner map which has 
to improve and update with the existed information to obtain the definitive map” 
(Yasanto, 2013, p. 41). Inter-marriage among villages also can change the piece of adat 
land status in the village. Besides that, the adat land that is owned by an adat com-
munity in one village is not always only inside the village, but also situated in other 
villages (Yasanto, 2013, p. 102). However, how this affects the map was not communi-
cated well to the adat community in the process of mapping. 
This lack of understanding the map, its legality, and how it can be used causes 
conflict among the members of clans and villages. Over-simplification of the im-
portance of participatory mapping by the NGOs has contributed to the problem. 
Participatory mapping has become a generic prescription for all adat communities 
struggling for their lands, whether or not the resulting maps are recognized by the 
government. The promotion of participatory mapping by Indonesian NGOs follows 
an international NGO movement, which also actively supports and funds the local 
NGOs working with adat communities in the MIFEE project. Although the NGOs 
believe that the maps produced from participatory mapping can be used to gain land 
formalization, and even land titling from the government, they have not considered 
the possible problems that these maps may cause. 
CONCLUSION
Participatory mapping has been considered as an important mechanism for adat 
communities in their struggle to claim rights to customary land. This perception is 
boosted by NGOs in Indonesia who also advocate on behalf of the Marind Anim in-
digenous people in Merauke. They believe that participatory mapping can stop the 
land grabbing taking place under the MIFEE project in Merauke district, Papua, and 
protect the adat land of the Marind Anim. Through an analysis of the land grabbing 
as well as the subsequent participatory mapping processes in three villages in the 
MIFEE area, this article has shown that, contrary to the intended purpose, participa-
tory mapping has initiated problems. First, it has caused fragmentation and conflict 
among adat communities. Second, the legal recognition of adat land through land 
formalization has led to the co-optation of adat land by companies and/or the state. 
Usually, the key problem for a company is the vagueness that surrounds adat land 
ownership. Participatory mapping renders visible the clear ownership of adat land, 
making it easier for a company to identify the target of negotiation for land. In addi-
tion, once a parcel of adat land is fixed as land owned by one person, adat land can be 
easily transferred into private land and can then be more easily leased by legal means. 
It is often forgotten that not only the adat communities themselves and NGOs, but 
also investors want legal recognition for adat communities. Traditional communities 
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are always seen as obstacles to development and are difficult to target for investors. 
Legal recognition makes it easier for them to find the target person with whom the 
company representative has to speak and negotiate. Thus, it can be said that partici-
patory mapping is creating a new space for legal land grabbing.
For adat land ownership, land formalization and titling could become a trap for 
adat communities and endanger their livelihoods. After land titling, adat land can be 
transferred, mortgaged, and sold in a legally-binding fashion, a process already ob-
served in Cambodia (Milne, 2013) and in the Philippines (Crisologo-Mendoza & Prill-
Brett, 2009). It is therefore not impossible that adat land will cease to exist and that 
private land ownership will become the dominant land ownership regime in Papua. 
In this sense, participatory mapping may become a new instrument to accelerate le-
gal land grabbing and create new conflicts between members of adat communities.
The new government under president Jokowi intends to continue the agricultural 
expansion in Merauke. The central government is planning to open another 1.2 mil-
lion ha for rice cultivation. To clarify the status of the land, Jokowi released the one 
map policy. The policy aims to create one map as a basis for spatial planning and for 
the release of all further investment permits. Considering that adat land has always 
been an obstacle for the implementation of the expansion project, can this policy 
be an opportunity for indigenous peoples to incorporate their traditional territories 
based on adat maps resulting from participation or does the mapping facilitate the 
investment in adat land? This question has to be considered by NGOs in their sup-
port of participatory mapping.
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